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Explaining Group Membership in the European Parliament 
 
Abstract: 
This paper examines the decisions behind group membership in the European Parliament. Following the goals ascribed to 
them by Strom in other settings (1990), national parties should join the largest group that matches their socioeconomic 
preferences. Yet, whilst explanations taking national parties as the basic unit of analysis might sometimes suffice, we argue 
that it is often necessary to consider the influence of individual party members and existing EP groups. The pursuit of 
individual and collective interests by all these actors determines the attractiveness of the various options open to a party 
weighing up its group affiliation in the European Parliament. After developing a conceptual framework to explain the 
dynamics behind membership decisions, we illustrate it by reference to the attempt by the British Conservative Party to 
leave the European People's Party-European Democrats (EPP-ED) group, an effort ending in the formation with the Czech 
Civic Democrats (ODS) of an extraparliamentary federation, the Movement for European Reform. 
 1. Introduction 
Although our understanding of the European Parliament (EP) has improved significantly in recent 
years, there has so far been no systematic attempt at explaining national parties’ choice of group 
membership. Analysis has instead focused on the more fundamental question of why groups should 
have formed in the EP and its predecessor in the first place as well as on the characteristics of group 
behaviour (Raunio 1997; Kreppel 2003; Hix et al, 2003; Hix et al., forthcoming). Here, we set out a 
conceptual framework to explain why national parties join, remain in and leave political groups, as well 
as the conditions under which political groups welcome new members.  
Reconfiguring a party’s relations in the EP requires the party leader to forge a solution acceptable to a 
wide range of other actors, in particular, existing party groups, other national party delegations 
represented in the EP, and the party’s own parliamentarians. The latter may be split in ideological terms 
as well as regarding their views about the utility of group membership. Our framework takes into 
account not only the actions and interests of these three sets of actors but also the fact that membership 
of these three categories may overlap. Our assumptions and expectations concerning the aims of 
national parties and European parliamentary groups are primarily based on the triad of political goals 
first set out by Strom (1990) and usually referred to in short-hand as ‘policy’, ‘office’ and ‘votes’. 
When peering inside parties, though, we argue that a different triad of goals is needed to explain the 
individual parliamentarians’ behaviour. We therefore ascribe to them slightly different interests, namely 
‘policy’, ‘career’ and ‘re-election’ (Mayhew, 1974; Hix et al., forthcoming: 33).  
Despite this emphasis on actors’ motivations, ours remains a rational-choice institutionalist model. Like 
Strom (1990: 566), then, we assume that parties are rational actors but ‘stress the constraints imposed 
by their organizational and institutional environments’. As regards the institutional setting in which 
membership decisions are reached, we emphasize the role played by the formal rules governing both 
group formation and the distribution of parliamentary power in defining the actions of national parties 
and EP groups. We also consider the way that these rules and those determining the formal balance of 
power within national parties spawn differential opportunities for individual parliamentarians to pursue 
their  goals  as  well  as  setting  the  scope  for  the  party  leader  to  reassert  the  ‘party  interest’. 
Organizationally, we stress the multi-level make-up of political parties and the constraints imposed by 
intra-party conflicts of interest. 
We illustrate our framework by reference to the British Conservatives’ attempt in the first half of 2006 
to leave their group in the EP, the European People’s Party-European Democrats (EPP-ED). These 
ructions ended not in the withdrawal of the Conservatives but rather in the establishment in July 2006 
of the Movement for European Reform (MER) an extraparliamentary party federation founded with the 
Czech ODS, which is supposed to form the basis for a new group in the next Parliament.  
It should be stressed that these developments have been chosen as a means to illustrate and explore - 
rather than to test - a conceptual framework that pays particular attention to the sometimes competing 
interests of different sets of actors. To this end, the Conservatives’ case is particularly fruitful: the 
various options open to the party were a matter of serious and lengthy deliberation throwing open the 
processes behind the identification of the ‘party interest’. The Conservatives also tried to persuade a 
range of parties to join them in forming a new group, so that this case allows us to examine – albeit 
cursorily - the group-membership decisions of more than just one party. In addition, the divergence of 
opinions  between  Conservative  MPs  and  MEPs,  as  well  as  between  eurosceptics  and  those 
parliamentarians more positively disposed towards European integration, highlights the importance of 
taking account of the distinct levels of the party and of different ideological factions in group-
membership decisions. Meanwhile, the timing of events – mid-parliament – meant that the response of 
the existing party groups was more robust than during the period at the beginning of parliament when 
they may find themselves somewhat in flux.  
 2. Choosing and forming groups in the European Parliament 
The decisions behind group membership in the European Parliament incorporate a hotchpotch of 
competing interests. Three sets of actors are potentially influential. First, national parties (as unitary 
actors) dominate these decisions, and therefore form the focus of our analysis. Second, it must be 
recognised that individual parliamentarians’ priorities in the question of group membership may diverge 
not only from the party interest but also from one another. Third, party groups themselves need to be 
considered as well since, even at the beginning of a new parliament, group formation does not occur in 
a tabula rasa environment. The way that these three sets of actors pursue their interests is defined in 
large  part  by  the  constraints  and  incentives  arising  from  their  institutional  and  organisational 
environment. Rules internal to the EP and national parties are stressed here. 
2.1. Policy, office, votes: parties and party groups as unitary actors 
Strom (1990) argues that parties (and groups) will pursue three goals: to exert substantial influence over 
policy outcomes (‘policy’), to occupy as many political posts as possible (‘office’), and to maximise the 
electoral support they win at poll time (‘votes’). These goals are not always mutually compatible; it is 
nevertheless possible to generalise about which of these three goals actors will privilege during 
processes of group formation and choice in the EP, and about the ways in which they might best be 
realised.  
Within the EP, national parties join a political group primarily when this supports their aim to maximise 
their office goals. This is not only because attaining office in the EP is desirable per se: office in the EP 
refers to the attainment not of a government post but rather a committee seat. Thanks to the EP’s internal 
rules, group membership is a significant factor in the distribution of committee seats amongst the 
national delegations. Outside plenary voting sessions, policy influence in the Parliament is best exercised 
through precisely these committee posts. Meanwhile, because the EP’s political system does not punish 
parties  that  vote  against  the  group  line  (Hix  and  Lord,  1997:  118),  group  membership  is  of 
comparatively little importance for parties seeking to influence policy outcomes during plenary voting 
sessions. All this, of course, is not to say that parties’ office and policy goals are always congruent. The 
EP’s  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  may  offer  its  members  little  influence  over  policy,  but  is  still 
considered a trump for a party in terms of prestige. Similarly, MEPs, particularly those occupying higher 
positions, are under pressure to temper their representation of their party’s policy preferences in favour 
of group preferences when exercising their office. This lack of congruence means that parties will tend 
to seek out a group that shares its policy preferences rather than simply the one that offers the best office 
prospects. 
Both the office and policy goals of parties can be best realised in the EP by membership of a large 
group, even if this group does not perfectly reflect their socioeconomic preferences (in the EP, the 
largest groups tend to be moderate on socio-economic questions as well as on those pertaining to issues 
of further European integration). The institutional rules of the EP mean that large groups enjoy a greater 
proportion of the available parliamentary offices to redistribute amongst member parties than their 
smaller counterparts (Maurer and Wessels 2003, 185-194): The distribution of posts and responsibilities 
is largely based on the principle of proportionality: the allocation of seats and posts in committees 
corresponds to the size of the EP groups.
i The Conference of Presidents is similarly dominated by the 
two largest groups. Within the context of these formal advantages, the largest groups wield more power 
than their smaller counterparts. The two largest groups usually provide the chairs for the most important 
committees. A group’s ability to secure for itself the responsibility for drafting parliamentary reports 
also increases with its size (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003).  
This boost to their office prospects is, though, not the only reason why membership in a large group can 
afford parties policy influence: since no government depends upon the support of a majority in the EP, 
individual parties’ defection from a group line is not severely punished in the political system of the EP. 
Members of a large group can thus seek to persuade a large number of their co-members to take on their 
preferences in plenary votes, influencing the overall position of the group as insiders, whilst retaining 
the possibility of going against the group line should they fail to sway their group. It is the two largest groups, the EPP-ED and the Party of European Socialists (PES), that can together ensure that proposed 
laws are successful under the voting rules of the EP: in the most important parts of the legislative 
process, the European Treaties require that a proposal enjoys the support of an absolute majority of 
MEPs, which means that a parliamentary majority between the groups can, in practical terms, only be 
usually created if the EPP-ED (35% of seats) and the PES (28%) cooperate (Maurer and Wessels 2003, 
192-193). Thus, although group membership is comparatively unimportant in the exercise of influence 
during plenary sessions, membership of a large group may nevertheless be understood as an ‘added 
bonus’.  
Office and policy concerns are privileged by dint of the fact that parties’ group affiliation is largely 
unknown to the electorate, minimising the importance of votes concerns. However, in the unlikely case 
that the electorate’s concerns do have to be taken into account by parties, vote-related goals may take 
precedence over parties’ policy- and office-related interests. Voters may well expect a national party to 
adhere to a group that demonstrably reflects its socio-economic stance and, in particular, its policy 
objectives on European integration. Yet, a party obliged to join a group that symbolically shares its 
views on European or socioeconomic issues may actually be unable to sign up to the group that best 
allows it to assert its preferences in practical terms: votes on issues of European integration are rare, 
meaning that parties will be diverted from the core task of influencing socioeconomic policy if obliged 
to join a group on symbolic grounds of European policy. Even if the party joins a group which 
ostentatiously shares its socioeconomic goals, this may preclude its joining one of the larger groups 
which might entail greater practical influence over socioeconomic policy.  
Turning from the national parties to the groups themselves, these may similarly be expected to pursue, 
above all, office- and policy-related goals. Like national parties, we can expect them to privilege group 
size over ideological cohesion: increasing their size brings office gains and policy influence. Since 
groups are not voted for by the electorate, votes-related concerns are of even less importance for them 
than they are for their constituent national parties. 
2.2. Policy, career and re-election: parties as non-unitary actors  
Parties cannot always be assumed to behave as unitary actors. As Strom (1990: 569) argues, ‘parties are 
complex organizations that impose various constraints on the behaviour of their leaders’. The level 
below the party leader key to group-membership decisions is that of individual parliamentarians; they 
can be ascribed goals that correspond broadly to the policy-, office- and votes-motivations of their 
parties. The difference is merely that between a collective and an individual interest. The aims 
attributed to individual politicians are ‘policy’, ‘career’ and ‘re-election’ (Mayhew, 1974; Hix et al., 
forthcoming: 33). Thus representatives seek to realise their preferred policies (policy), achieve a high-
ranking position (office) and be returned to parliament (re-election).  
Usually these individual interests are broadly congruent with the equivalent collective party interest. 
Thus individual politicians’ prospects for re-election are, for example, often best served by their efforts 
to  maximise  their  party’s  votes.  This  is  particularly  true  for  party-centred  legislatures,  where 
parliamentarians have little incentive to cultivate a personal vote (Mitchell, 2000). In candidate-centred 
systems such as in the US, legislators’ behaviour can however easily run counter to the collective party 
interest as individual members of Congress seeks to maximise their constituency-specific benefits (Cox 
and McCubbins, 1993).  
In the case of the party leader, the congruence between individual and party success is clear: the 
leader’s position is best secured by bringing maximum success to the whole party (Müller and Strom, 
1999). The trouble arises when individual parliamentarians’ interests run contrary to the collective party 
interest, or where priorities are unevenly distributed between certain categories of parliamentarian, 
leading to internal tensions. This can easily come to pass in the process of group formation in the 
European Parliament. This is because group membership in the EP has different consequences for 
MEPs in terms of their career, policy influence and re-election prospects than it does for national 
parliamentarians. For MEPs, group membership is central to their career development and their influence over policy; for MPs, meanwhile, group membership has most impact on their re-election 
prospects (as well as their ability to influence policy indirectly). It was noted above that privileging 
electoral concerns in the question of group membership can come at the cost of achieving policy 
influence and office. Tensions can therefore arise between the two levels of a national party, especially 
where MPs’ prospects of re-election are seriously endangered by a choice of group membership which 
would bring their MEPs office and policy influence. 
These tensions across the two levels of the party become harder to capture conceptually when one 
acknowledges that group membership is not exclusively considered by politicians or a party’s broader 
membership in terms of a party’s office, policy or votes considerations: affiliation with a group in the 
EP can actually be a constitutive element of a party’s European or socio-economic policy goals. 
Membership of a eurosceptic group, for example, could be considered a eurosceptic policy, rather than 
a means to influence policy. In this context, the choice of group is not only a means of increasing policy 
influence, but also a policy outcome. National politicians, whose prospects for career success, re-
election and policy influence are seldom directly affected by group membership, are more likely than 
their European-level colleagues to view membership as a question of European policy – and a rather 
symbolic one at that. 
2.3. Forming, Joining or Leaving a group: the options 
Four options are open to an aligned party that is reconsidering its current affiliation in the EP: forming 
a new group, joining an existing group becoming non-aligned, and maintaining membership of its 
current group, but under more favourable conditions.  
Forming a new group is theoretically – though seldom practically – the most attractive choice since it 
would allow an alignment of the party’s collective interest, with that of its individual parliamentarians 
and, naturally enough, with that of the group itself: Forming a sizeable group ‘in one’s own image’ 
could bring office and policy benefits to a party and its MEPs and would ensure a close match on 
socioeconomic and European policy preferences. However, the EP’s internal institutional rules take on 
real importance here. The requirement that a group consist of a minimum of 20 MEPs from at least one 
fifth  of  Member  States  means  that  a  party  will  need  several  partners,  each  with  several 
parliamentarians, in order to form a new group.
ii This option is thus the most difficult to realise.  
Meanwhile, joining one of the other groups could also enable a national party to realise office and 
policy goals. However, in order to bring a similar alignment of interests within the national party, this 
option depends on the existence of a sizeable group with a suitable policy profile. Usually, the other 
groups should happily accept a new member due to the office and policy benefits that increased size 
will bring in the institutional environment of the EP. However, the goodwill of the group cannot be 
taken for granted. For example, a rival party from the same member state may already be part of that 
group and block entry. Even if accession to the group is granted, office and policy concessions may 
have to be granted by the party requesting admission. 
Non-alignment is the easiest option to achieve, as it requires no co-ordination with other actors. 
However, the institutional makeup of the EP means that this option carries with it significant costs for 
the party in terms of office and policy. Without group membership, MEPs, and the party, have fewer 
political resources and thus fewer means to influence the work of the EP: for example, non-attached 
representatives can only very rarely take up important posts within the Parliament and can scarcely 
hope to gain a pivotal role in votes (Corbett et al., 2003: 59). Non-alignment might also make parties 
appear isolated in Europe, which can have effects on the electoral reputation of the party, as well as 
potentially being symbolically out of step with aspects of their substantive European policy.  
Should these options fail or be ruled out as impractical, there remains to the party the paltry choice 
between seeking to alter its current conditions of membership (as William Hague sought to do in 1999) 
so that it is better able to pursue its votes, policy and/or office interests, or indeed its symbolic 
concerns, or to face up to the prospect of continued membership under the same conditions.  2.4. Group choice and formation as a result of individual, party- or group-interest? 
In short then, since national parties are the main actors in the EP at the time of group formation, we 
assume that group membership will reflect unitary national parties’ pursuit of their interests. Weighing 
up the handful of options available to them, it is to be expected that parties will choose to join or form a 
group that broadly shares its socioeconomic policy preferences. This is the principal cleavage in the EP 
(Hix et al., forthcoming), and belonging to a group with congruent socioeconomic aims will bring a 
happy  marriage  between  office  and  policy  goals.  When,  thanks  to  their  similar  socioeconomic 
preferences, more than one group is considered suitable for membership, parties seek out the largest, as 
this is beneficial to both policy and office goals. Votes-related considerations rarely influence the 
decision for or against membership of a particular group and are always weighed up against possible 
gains in office and policy in the EP.  
However, the behaviour of national parties may not always be unitary. Under certain circumstances the 
interests of various categories of parliamentarians will diverge significantly from the party interest. 
These include times when a choice of group membership that would favour MEPs’ influence over policy 
and their career prospects endangers MPs’ chances of re-election. They also include situations where a 
choice of group membership that would favour MEPs’ influence over policy, their career and/or re-
election prospects clashes significantly with a socioeconomic or European policy preference held by 
MPs. MPs are, in turn, likely to privilege these concerns when their own policy, office and votes 
considerations are not much affected by the question of group membership. One particular set of intra-
party interests may prevail, especially when the national party leader, who may for analytical purposes 
be seen as the guardian of the party’s collective interest, is unable to use the formal tools at his disposal 
to reassert the common interest.  
Under certain circumstances (pre-)existing groups will also be relatively successful in asserting their 
interests vis-à-vis those of national parties. Many of the groups in the EP have built up considerable 
administrative machinery over the last decades and belong to a broader, extra-parliamentary European 
party. This does much to ensure their continued existence across parliaments as well as their capacity to 
behave as actors in their own right during periods of group formation, independently influencing 
individual national parties’ choice of membership.  
Existing groups might have particularly strong influence when:  
-  the parties in question are closely bound to the administrative structure of the group;  
-  the parties in question are members of the same extra-parliamentary European party as the 
group;  
-  efforts at group formation take place mid-Parliament; the group in question has the means to 
exert  an  independent  influence  upon  a  party’s  prospects  of  achieving  votes,  policy  and 
influence, for example by threatening political isolation in the EU. 
 
3. A marriage of convenience? The British Conservatives and the EPP-ED 
There are currently eight political groups in the Parliament, the largest of which is the EPP-ED (with 
277 members from 48 national delegations). After the German CDU/CSU, the 26 British Conservative 
MEPs that remain in the group form the second largest contingent in the EPP-ED.
iii The EPP-ED can 
trace its heritage back to the Common Assembly (CA) of the European Coal and Steel Community, in 
which a Christian Democratic party group was first formed (Jansen, 2006: 67-76; Kreppel, 2002: 
179ff.).  
The first European enlargement in 1973 meant that parties with different political traditions had to be 
integrated into the Parliament’s group system. The British and Danish Conservatives formed their own 
group, the European Conservatives, as they differed in both European and socioeconomic preferences 
from the EPP, as it was then named (Hanley, 2002: 454). After the first EP elections, the British and 
Danish Conservatives, which together made up a sizeable contingent in the Parliament, continued their cooperation  under  the  name  ‘European  Democrats’  (Raunio,  1997:  67).  In  1992,  the  European 
Democrats fused with the EPP group in the EP. The EPP had been pursuing a conscious strategy of 
broadening its membership since the 1980s (Jansen, 1998: 115), while the Conservatives at the time 
wanted to end their party’s perceived isolation in Europe. Moreover, after the 1989 elections, the 
European Democrats were only the fifth- and no longer the third-largest group in the EP (Gagatek, 
2004: 4). The benefits of joining a larger group were clear, as this would allow the Conservatives to 
continue to occupy prominent posts in the EP (office) and influence political decisions as the powers of 
the EP grew (policy). Nevertheless, the Conservatives never joined the extraparliamentary EPP 
federation:  co-operation  has  always  been  limited  to  the  parliamentary  group.  As  a  result,  the 
Conservatives have never had to take on or adapt to the political goals of the EPP group, in particular its 
commitment to federalism (Hanley, 2002: 469).  
The relationship between the Conservatives and the EPP was weakened at the outset of the Fifth 
Parliament (1999-2004). The relatively pro-European John Major had been replaced as leader of the 
Conservatives by the openly eurosceptic William Hague, and after the EP elections in 1999, the 
parameters of the party’s relationship were officially altered. The Conservatives reconstituted the 
European Democrats, which together with the EPP now form the EPP-ED.  The other members of the 
ED section of the EPP-ED are the Northern Irish Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the Czech ODS, the 
Portuguese Popular Party (PP) and the Italian Pensioners’ Party.  
The changed relationship was more advantageous to the Conservatives than to the EPP as a whole. The 
adjustment was particularly attractive for office and policy reasons. First, the Conservatives were now 
officially free to decide whether to follow the group line in parliamentary votes. Second, they continued 
to receive prominent posts as the second-largest member of the largest parliamentary group (Gagatek, 
2004: 8). Moreover, the prominent renaming of the group brought the relationship more in line with the 
eurosceptic bent of Conservative policy on European integration in symbolic terms. All the same, these 
changes were not enough to placate Hague’s successor, Iain Duncan-Smith, who was widely suspected 
of initiating a withdrawal strategy before his untimely political demise. 
Dissatisfaction at the Conservative presence in the EPP-ED has not been one-sided. In the last 
parliament, there were even attempts within the group to exclude the Tories, especially as they voted 
against  the  group  line  one  third  of  the  time  (Hix  et  al.,  forthcoming:  180).  However,  as  the 
Conservatives were a numerically important contingent of the EPP-ED, there was always a majority of 
MEPs who opposed their exclusion.  
In the Sixth Parliament, the Tories have been no more cooperative than before (Hix and Noury, 2006: 
11).  Differences  with  the  EPP  remain  in  socio-economic  policies  and  especially  on  European 
integration. Among the larger national parties, only the Czech ODS votes similarly to the Conservatives 
(ibid.). 
Against the background of the party- and group-political landscape in the Sixth Parliament, and in 
particular the dearth of parties and groups that would allow them to form or join a sizeable group ‘ in 
their own image’ it becomes possible to discern the party interest in group membership: if they were to 
act as a unitary party according to Strom’s schema, the British Conservatives’ interests would be best 
met  by  remaining  in  the  EPP-ED.  The  current  relationship  allows  the  party  to  occupy  some 
comparatively high-profile posts in the EP.￿At the time of Cameron’s election to the leadership, the 
Conservative Party provided one of the Parliament’s 14 vice-presidents, a chairman of one of the 
Parliament’s 20 Committees and two Committee vice-chairmen. Four Conservative MEPs were group 
coordinators for the EPP-ED. The Conservatives as a whole also provided a slightly disproportionate 
number of Committee members (4.4% of the total although they make up 3.7% of the Parliament 
(Maurer and Parkes, 2006)). Furthermore, through their EPP-ED membership the Conservatives 
achieve influence over policy.  They do so partly through the possession of relatively key posts but also 
thanks to the rules that formalise their ability to influence the position of their group as ‘full members’ 
and simultaneously vote against the group line. Since there is little to suggest that this realisation of office and policy interests through cooperation with the EPP-ED has any electoral consequences, the 
benefits to policy and office seem clearly to outweigh any vote-maximising considerations. 
There  are,  however,  serious  internal  divisions  within  the  Conservative  party  concerning  group 
membership. Firstly, there is a tension between the party’s votes-related interests on the one hand and 
its policy/office-related interests on the other. As noted above, though, this tension was qualified by the 
fact that Conservative voters, though predominantly eurosceptic, may be assumed largely to disregard 
the issue of EP group membership in their voting behaviour. More seriously, a symbolic clash existed 
between the party’s membership of the EPP-ED and the party’s policy preferences on European 
integration:  there  was  a  disjuncture  between  the  party’s  eurosceptic  policy  preferences  and  its 
membership of the pro-European EPP-ED – a membership that brings the party’s MEPs career and 
policy benefits.  
 
4. A Distinctly Non-Unitary Party? The Eurosceptics under Cameron
iv 
4.1. The formal balance of power under Cameron: the reforms of 1997 
The Conservatives’ most recent efforts to reconfigure their relations in the EP were characterised by 
their new leader’s struggle to demonstrate his factual authority over the party and to assert the party 
interest. Although the Conservative party is often thought of as a highly centralised party, with control 
over the tools of party management heavily weighted towards the leadership, this idea requires 
qualification. Following its loss of power in 1997, the Conservative Party pursued a policy of internal 
democratisation, leading in formal terms to a partial decentralisation of control over the party’s control 
of individual parliamentarians’ career and re-election prospects and policy influence (Hopkin, 2001; 
Lees-Marshment and Quayle, 2001). The leader’s formal capacity to assert the ‘party interest’ shrank 
concomitantly (Maurer et al., 2007). Indeed, through these reforms, grassroots party members’ role in 
electing the leader was also considerably upgraded, although the parliamentary party retains the 
capacity to exclude the broader membership if it manages to reach internal agreement on a new leader 
itself. Potential candidates for Parliament too are much more subject to the scrutiny and input of 
constituency members than before. For MEPs, this decentralisation of candidate selection procedures 
has been even more marked than for MPs: during the 1999 European elections incumbents were not 
guaranteed automatic reselection.  
4.2. The factual balance of power: group membership in the broader context of policy change 
All the same, it is the leader’s factual capacity to use these formal powers that counts. For example, in 
spite – and perhaps even because (see Maurer and Parkes, 2006:Fn.5) – of this de jure decentralisation 
of  the  formal  balance  of  power  in  favour  of  the  broader  party  membership,  the  leader  of  the 
Conservatives retains in real terms a significant capacity to control the political behaviour of the party 
and assert collective party interests over those of individuals and sub-groups.  
Naturally enough, Cameron’s 2005 election pledge to remove the Conservatives from the EPP-ED – 
made not for ideological reasons, but rather to boost his chances of election – had considerably 
improved the capacity of the eurosceptic parliamentarians to push for a withdrawal from the EPP-ED. 
Calls for withdrawal were particularly loud at the national level, although a prominent group of 
eurosceptic MEPs were also vocal. These MEPs were largely part of a cohort of more eurosceptic 
parliamentarians who had been elected recently, in the Fifth and Sixth Parliaments. Their junior status 
meant that they were comparatively excluded from the office benefits that membership of the EPP-ED 
brings to the national delegation as a whole. Withdrawal from the group, sanctioned by the national 
leadership, potentially promised a short cut to office benefits, bringing their office considerations more 
in line with their views of substantive European policy. It should also be noted that an overwhelming 
majority of Conservative MEPs were in favour of staying in the EPP-ED, with only eight delegation 
members voicing a clear desire to leave their group.
v  Thanks to his professed aim of altering a wide range of the Conservatives’ official policy preferences, 
the party’s eurosceptics gained further leverage over their new leader. Following his election, Cameron 
was primarily engaged in tactical efforts to make the British Conservatives’ domestic and foreign policy 
positions more appealing to voters.  In many ways, these attempts ran contrary to his efforts to remove 
the  British  Conservatives  from  the  EPP-ED,  which  has  defended  a  relatively  centrist  line  on 
socioeconomic and foreign policy issues.  
It is precisely because of these incongruities that Cameron’s efforts to withdraw British Conservative 
MEPs from the EPP-ED attained a broader significance at the national level: analysis from previous 
parliaments suggests that MPs supporting a eurosceptic policy – of which EPP-ED withdrawal is a key 
substantive  aspect  –  tend  to  favour  the  kind  of  economically  non-interventionist  and  socially 
conservative positions (Heppell, 2002) that Cameron was seeking to leave behind. There was therefore 
speculation that Cameron would pursue withdrawal from the EPP-ED as a key eurosceptic policy 
outcome in order to ensure the progress of broader policy change: since European issues are of 
disproportionately more salience to Conservative MPs than they are to the electorate (Norris and 
Lovenduski, 2001, 2004, Usherwood, 2002), Cameron would be able to effect a wide-ranging change in 
social and economic policy having bought the goodwill of recalcitrant MPs by concessions in a policy 
area of secondary electoral importance. This tactic of ‘buying off’ reluctant MPs would come despite 
considerable ‘costs’ to most MEPs and the collective party interests.  
Instead, Cameron adopted a more subtle tactic: rather than formulating a hard-line eurosceptic policy 
before social and economic policy change had been accomplished, he preferred to depoliticise European 
policy so that it did not interfere with his broader efforts, and seemed likely to adopt a eurosceptic 
position only in response to MPs’ resistance to his broader policy agenda (Maurer and Parkes, 2006). 
Although his hard-line position on the specific issue of the party’s relationship with the EPP-ED was 
largely defined prior to his leadership, he sought to pursue a similar approach towards this question too.  
Yet, Cameron did not have time on his side in his efforts to assert his control over the party. He was 
under pressure from unsettled Conservative MEPs, eurosceptic MPs and even opportunist opposition 
politicians not afraid to raise questions of European policy that may have proved divisive for their own 
party (on this last issue see Hillebrand, 2006).
 The threat made by some Eurosceptic MEPs that they 
would unilaterally adopt non-aligned status if no new arrangement was realised raised the spectre of 
open intra-party divisions. Additional time pressure arose from the fact that, out of government, the 
removal of his party from the EPP-ED was one aspect of substantive policy that could be realised. 
Against a background of general suspicion that Cameron was merely formulating a policy programme 
that would appeal to the electorate, but which he had no intention of actually realising, the withdrawal 
received considerable attention. 
 
5. Five options for the Sixth Parliament 
5.1. Ruling out non-alignment, group accession and group formation 
Including the choice of staying in the EPP-ED under the same conditions as before, Cameron faced five 
options to deal with the fallout from his election pledge. Two of these were quickly ruled out, despite 
the considerable pressure from eurosceptic MPs for withdrawal: non-aligned status and accession to 
another group. It soon became clear that neither alternative would have advantageous consequences for 
MEPs or the Conservative party as a whole.  
Non-aligned status had the benefit for the Conservatives that it could have been realised with minimal 
interaction with other actors in the EP. However, it offered few other advantages. Apparent political 
isolation in the EP might most appeal to those within the Conservative party who view Britain as 
detached  from  the  EU  and  seek  to  withdraw  from  the  EU  altogether;  for  most  Conservative 
parliamentarians it would however smack of an unfortunate radicalism. Non-aligned status would bring 
little either for the party (in terms of policy, votes or office) or for individual parliamentarians (in terms of policy, re-election or career). For this reason, the threats of a few MEPs to withdraw unilaterally 
from the EPP-ED and adopt non-aligned status held little weight.  
Joining another group was unattractive, even for eurosceptic MPs: the only groups that might offer 
themselves for accession were the UEN and I/D. Given their current, amenable arrangements with the 
large EPP-ED, neither option would have boosted the Conservative party’s policy or office-related 
interests. Furthermore, the presence of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and Alleanza 
Nazionale (with its perceived fascist heritage) in the I/D group and the UEN, respectively, might well 
have damaged the Conservatives’ vote-maximising ambitions and perhaps even individual MPs’ re-
election (Wagner, 2006a). For their part, some national parties in the two party groups might also have 
suffered in electoral terms thanks to a Conservative accession (for example UKIP in I/D and the Irish 
party Fianna Fail in the UEN). Thus, although the two groups would have gained as a whole given the 
considerable increase in size that a Conservative accession would bring, some member parties would 
have resisted, perhaps demanding concessions from the Conservatives in terms of parliamentary posts 
or formal influence over group positions.   
Attention thus turned to the option of group formation: it was the only possible path providing a 
satisfactory strategic outcome. This option was still not as favourable to the party’s collective interests 
as continued membership of the EPP-ED; nevertheless, in theoretical terms, it offered an opportunity to 
meet the concerns of Conservative MPs without overly compromising those of the party’s MEPs. 
Forging a new group with a strong eurosceptic profile at the European level would symbolically concur 
with MPs’ substantive European policy preferences. It would also meet MPs’ concerns about how 
membership of the EPP-ED might affect their election prospects, in a way that accession to the UEN or 
I/D or indeed non-aligned status could not. Forming a sizable group broadly sharing Conservative 
MEPs’ socioeconomic preferences would somewhat offset the damage to their career prospects and 
their policy influence which withdrawal from the EPP-ED would elicit. Given the EP’s institutional 
rules, the barriers to realising this option were of course high. 
Given the makeup of the Sixth Parliament, it quickly became apparent that group formation within the 
EP would scarcely reconcile the interests of (eurosceptic) MPs with those of most MEPs and the party 
as a whole. The difficulties of enticing parties away from their group mid-Parliament meant that the 
Conservatives’ choice of partners was extremely narrow (Maurer and Parkes, 2006).
 The EPP-ED’s 
strategy of privileging group size over ideological cohesion meant that many of the ideologically close 
prospective partners for the Conservatives were already members of the Parliament’s largest group. 
Ironically, it is partly due to the British Conservatives’ earlier efforts to assert themselves in the group 
that other Conservative parties enjoy a somewhat privileged position in the EPP-ED, and few of these 
(apart perhaps from the Czech ODS) appeared ready to give this up. Enticing parties away from their 
current groups would in all probability have required the Conservatives to make concessions in terms of 
the parliamentary posts offered to partners as well as their formal influence over the group line.  
Beyond these formal ‘goods’, the Conservatives had two other, less tangible, goods which might be 
strategically  deployed  to  attract  prospective  partners:  their  ‘respectability’  as  a  former  party  of 
government in an established democracy and their size. Yet, their respectability was primarily attractive 
to  those  parties  widely  deemed  to  lack  this  quality,  and  which  thus  might  have  damaged  the 
Conservatives’ own electoral prospects. Meanwhile, their size would have been most attractive to 
smaller parties, who might thereby gain office and policy influence in the EP; however, members of the 
EPP-ED already enjoyed such advantages, whilst more radical parties in the EP would have demanded 
some kind of safeguard that they would not be dwarfed by the Tories in any new group.  
As it happened, the Conservatives implicitly acknowledged the lack of ideological overlap with their 
prospective partners as regards the two principal cleavages in the EP (socioeconomic issues and 
European integration): they stated the aim of forging a group united by its common commitment to 
atlanticism, decentralism (an oblique reference to euroscepticism) and the free market. Yet even this 
proved an unsuitable basis for group formation: some of the parties that it approached (notably the 
Mouvement pour la France) reject atlanticism; others (the Dutch Christian Union, the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS), the Latvian for Fatherland and Freedom Party) are sceptical of free-market policies 
(Maurer  and  Parkes,  2006:  15).  Moreover,  even  the  Czech  ODS,  which  shares  many  of  the 
Conservatives’ socioeconomic preferences as well as their concerns about the future of European 
integration, proved reluctant to commit itself. This reluctance was perhaps even more surprising given 
that, in order to attract the ODS, the Conservatives had offered concessions in terms of office 
(apparently offering the chair of the new group to the Czechs). Yet the ODS, like other members of the 
EPP-ED, was under pressure from its partners within that group as well as its extra-parliamentary party 
to retain its membership. Moreover, it was facing a general election at the national level; controversy 
about their positioning in the EP might have compromised its electoral prospects as well as its capacity 
to build a governing coalition. 
5.2. Steps towards the retention of the EPP-ED membership 
Cameron’s capacity to assert the party’s collective interest vis-à-vis those of individual parliamentarians 
grew in the first half of 2006. His broad personal support amongst the electorate, as reflected in 
favourable opinion-poll results, increased his de facto control over MPs’ electoral and career prospects. 
Increasingly, it appeared that Cameron would be well-placed to maintain the party’s relations with the 
EPP-ED if he decided, in contrast to his campaign promise, that this was the most advantageous course 
of action.  
Moreover, the party’s partners in the EPP-ED and its mother party, the EPP, functioned – perhaps 
unknowingly – as allies to the Conservative leader, putting pressure not only on the Conservatives’ 
prospective partner parties, but also on the Conservatives themselves, to remain in the group. It is 
certainly the case that the EPP-ED’s capacity to steer the outcome of the Conservatives’ efforts was 
both formally and factually extremely limited.
vi It was nevertheless useful for Cameron and the shadow 
Foreign Minister, William Hague, to point to the obstacles to group formation arising from other actors 
in the EP, and thereby to disguise their own interest in retaining the relationship with the EPP-ED.  
These obstacles were increased when the ODS failed to win a clear victory in the Czech domestic 
elections and was thrown headlong into a difficult period of coalition-building with the pro-European 
Christian Democrat party. Again, the ODS’ overall party interest would not, at that stage, have been 
furthered by breaking with the EPP-ED. A high-profile altercation between the ODS and the PiS 
appeared to put the nail in the coffin for the Conservatives’ efforts at group formation (Wagner, 2006b). 
Yet, eurosceptics at the national level became increasingly aware that Cameron was aiming to maintain 
relations with the EPP-ED. Their robust counter-reaction apparently took Cameron by surprise, and the 
Conservative leadership cast about for a new option that would alleviate the need to withdraw from the 
EPP-ED but nevertheless alter relations with the group in the Conservatives’ favour.  
It is in this light that the foundation of the MER should be seen. This extra-parliamentary party 
federation founded with the ODS is supposed to form the basis for a new parliamentary group in the 
Seventh European Parliament. The federation remains in its infancy, and it is unclear whether it is being 
actively pursued as part of a long-term project to form a group ‘in the image of the Conservatives’ or 
whether it was merely a stopgap solution to pacify eurosceptic MPs. Whatever the case, the federation 
allows the Conservatives to remain in the EPP-ED until the end of the Sixth Parliament, thus meeting 
the party’s collective – and MEPs’ individual – interests at least in the short term. That the small band 
of disgruntled MEPs did not carry through with their promise unilaterally to quit the EPP-ED indicates 
that they were not prepared to place their career on the line in order to pursue group membership as a 
manifestation of their views on European integration. Cameron reinforced this disinclination by 
threatening  MEPs  with  deselection  should  they  do  so,  thereby  increasing  the  costs  to  them  of 
withdrawal whilst offering them an excuse to back down without losing face. 
6. Conclusion 
The Conservatives’ recent manoeuvring has provided a good opportunity to illustrate a framework 
capturing the principal dynamics underpinning parties’ choice of group membership in the EP. Given 
the EP’s institutional rules, we suggest that national parties acting in unitary fashion should belong to the party group that maximises their opportunity to realise office and policy goals. We argue that this is 
usually best achieved by joining the largest possible group that shares the delegation’s socioeconomic 
(and, to a far lesser degree, EU integration-related) policy preferences. This was indeed the course 
followed by the leader of the Conservative party, firstly in his forlorn efforts to form a new group and 
then in the retention of the EPP-ED membership. The pursuit of these interests was largely conditioned 
by the internal rules of the EP, which factually precluded the establishment of a new group, whilst 
pushing  the  Conservatives  into  the  arms  of  the  largest  group  that  shares  their  socioeconomic 
preferences.   
If group membership does take on electoral implications or is perceived as a substantive aspect of 
European or socioeconomic policy, these considerations should rival office and policy priorities. Given 
that individual parliamentarians across the two levels of the national party, and different ideological 
factions at both levels, weight the office- votes-, policy- and symbolic aspects of group membership in 
different ways, tensions over these goals are likely to be played out within national parties. It was thus 
no surprise to find considerable divergence between (eurosceptic) MPs and MEPs (more positively 
disposed towards European integration) about the course to be taken. The course of action finally taken 
depended in large part upon Cameron’s capacity to use his formal powers to create party unity. The 
MER can thus be understood as a last sop to eurosceptic parliamentarians, boosting his factual authority 
within the party.  
Cameron also received – perhaps unwitting – support from the EPP-ED in his efforts to assert the party 
interest. Despite internal tensions, the group maintained its policy of pursuing size over ideological 
cohesion, even though this would have provided a suitable occasion to loosen or break ties with the 
Conservatives.  It  is  certainly  the  case  that  the  EPP-ED’s  capacity  to  steer  the  outcome  of  the 
Conservatives’ efforts was extremely limited. The EPP-ED would, for example, have struggled to offer 
the Conservatives further concessions to remain in the group, running the risk of upsetting other 
member parties at a time when group cohesion was paramount. The fact that the Conservatives under 
Hague and Duncan-Smith had already made noises about leaving the group, but had failed to follow 
through, gave the EPP-ED leadership a clearer picture of the intra-party constraints faced by the 
Conservative leadership in going through with its promise, and increased the EPP-ED’s readiness to 
refuse the party concessions. The leadership of the EPP-ED was, however, able to threaten the 
Conservatives and others leaving the group with sanctions, indicating that they would receive the cold 
shoulder from the remaining group members. 
Although  the  Sixth  Parliament  did  not  witness  the  establishment  of  a  new  party  group  by  the 
Conservatives, in 2007 there was a new addition to the family of EP groups: 20 MEPs representing far-
right parties from 7 member states founded the Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty Group. The 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania meant that there were 20 MEPs from at least five member states 
willing to form a new group, thus helping far-right parties overcome the institutional hurdle that 
prevented the formation of a group by the Conservatives. After having been without their own group 
since 1994, Europe's extreme right could once again realise the office and policy opportunities that 
party groups provide. How this will affect the Conservatives’ efforts to establish a group in the next 
Parliament remains to be seen. 
 
 
Notes 
i Rule 177.1 of the EP’s Rules of Procedure. 
ii Rule 29.2 of the EP’s Rules of Procedure. Prior to the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, only 19 
MEPs were needed to form a group. 
iii A twenty-seventh Conservative MEP, Roger Helmer, was ejected from the EPP-ED and is non-
aligned but still a member of the Conservative delegation. iv The information for this and the following section is based primarily on reports in the British press 
and MEPs’ websites. For background information and in order to corroborate these reports, we also 
conducted several informal, off-the-record interviews with MEPs, MPs, their assistants, Conservative 
Central Office and well-placed observers. 
v See http://www.adieu-epp.com. 
vi “Merkel tells British Conservative leader to stick with EPP partners,” The Times, 16 December 2005, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/ article/0,,13509-1934239,00.html; “Merkel Warns Cameron over MEP 
Plans,” The Guardian, 5 December 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,,1668250,00.html. 
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